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Abstract 
In this paper we study the emergence and the effects of a possession norm in an 
artificial society. We link the study of norms and the concept of memes as put forward 
by Richard Dawkins. Normative behaviour is modelled using memes as carriers for 
certain behaviours. For our simulations we extend the sugarscape model from Epstein 
and Axtell (1996) and give the agents the possibility to claim possession of a "plot" of 
land. Memes regulate the behaviour of the agents regarding the land claims of others. 
It turns out that the probability for the survival of the population is much higher when 
possession claims of others are respected. However, there exist short term 
disadvantages for agents respecting the possessions of others. Thus, the need for a 
possession norm arises. The introduction of sanctions provides a good possibility to 
enforce the norm as long as no costs arise for sanctioning agents. We also investigate 
different kinds of meme propagation and their effects on the establishment of the 
norm.  
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Introduction  
1.1  
From the social science point of view, the simulation of fundamental properties of 
social systems may be helpful to construct and improve theories. The simulation of 
some qualitative properties of social systems makes it possible to ascribe the high 
complexity of such systems to the co- operation of a few relevant factors. An inherent 
advantage of individual- (i.e. agent-) based simulation as compared to standard 
techniques of simulation is the opportunity to model the individual and the local 
interaction of the individuals instead of having to develop a more-or-less plausible 
'mean-field' model of societies.  
1.2  
On the opposite shore, namely in the field of computer science, the aim to construct 
multi-agent systems poses difficulties typically found in human societies, e.g. the 
problem to achieve co-ordinated behaviour without a centralised regulation or the 
problem to choose a proper action from a large number of possibilities. This leads in a 
natural way to approaches motivated by examples from human society and making 
use of models and theories from social science. By this, one hopes to find solutions 
for key problems of co-ordination or communication for which natural societies often 
display efficient and robust solutions.  
1.3  
Social norms are important parts on the macro level of social systems and influence 
the behaviour of individuals. Their various functions are the enabling of co-ordinated 
behaviour, the control of aggression or the reduction of complexity in social 
situations. This makes them an interesting issue for multi-agent systems research. We 
try to investigate the question when and how these macro properties can emerge from 
individual behaviour and how they influence the evolution of the system as a whole. 
A full model for 'real' societies is far off our scope. Instead, we try to build a simple 
model and to simulate certain specific mechanisms that might appear in human 
societies. As we will show, typical problems concerning the emergence and the 
enforcement of norms will indeed occur in our simulations.  
1.4  
Our agents are purely reactive and have no internal reasoning capacity. We wish to 
show that even with these types of agents it is possible to simulate an emergent macro 
property like a social norm. As a basis for our model we use the sugarscape model of 
Epstein and Axtell (Epstein/Axtell 1996) because this relatively simple model can be 
readily extended for our purpose. We decided to simulate possession norms because 
this fundamental type of norms fits smoothly into the sugarscape scenario. After 
outlining former work on the simulation of norms we will present our view on norms 
and link this view to the concept of memes. The sugarscape model and our extensions 
are described in the subsequent section. Following that, we present our results and 
finish with some conclusions.  
Previous Work  
2.1  
Previous work in simulating norms concentrates either on the possibility whether a 
norm emerges or not (Axelrod 1986, Coleman 1986/87) or on the effects of an 
explicitly given norm (Conte/Castelfranchi 1995, Castelfranchi/Conte/Paolucci 1998, 
Saam/Harrer 1999). Coleman uses the prisoner's dilemma to study the influence of the 
social structure on the effectiveness of sanctions. In his simulations he divides a 
population of 100 individuals into subgroups and matches the individuals in these 
subgroups to play the prisoner's dilemma. The individuals can remember a given 
number of partners and their last action (defect or co-operate) and follow a strategy 
that uses this information. Coleman concludes that co-operation emerges easier in 
small groups.  
2.2  
Axelrod chooses an evolutionary approach to study the emergence of norms. 
According to him, norms "... exist in a given situation if individuals act in a certain 
way and are often punished when seen not to be acting in this way." (Axelrod 1986, p. 
1097). In his game theoretic approach he constructs a 'norms game' based on the 
prisoner's dilemma. He uses a kind of genetic algorithm to evolve strategies that 
consists of the components boldness to violate norms and vengefulness to punish 
norm violations. In some cases, the populations show low rates of boldness and high 
rates of vengefulness which indicates that a norm has emerged. This emergence of 
norms can be improved through the introduction of metanorms, i.e. norms that 
prescribe punishment for those who do not punish norm violations.  
2.3  
Conte and Castelfranchi (Conte/Castelfranchi 1995) investigate how norms control 
and reduce aggression and how they influence individual differences. They simulate 
agents moving in a two-dimensional common world and eating food to gain strength. 
Agents can attack each other while eating food, which takes some time. Conte and 
Castelfranchi compare three different conditions: 'blind aggression' (always attack 
whenever the costs of alternatives are higher), 'strategic' (only attack when your 
opponent's strength is not higher than your own) and 'normative' (agents own food 
appearing in their neighbourhood and can not be attacked while eating their own 
food). They state that aggression (the number of attacks) and inequality (the standard 
deviation of the agent's strength levels) is lowest and the agents' average strength is 
highest under the 'normative' condition.  
2.4  
Castelfranchi, Conte and Paolucci (Castelfranchi/Conte/Paolucci 1998) continue this 
work to study the role of normative reputation. They split the agent population into 
two halves, each following different norms (blind or strategic, blind or normative, 
strategic or normative). It exposes that now the normative agents have the lowest 
average strength because there are cost-free advantages for transgressors. 
Castelfranchi, Conte and Paolucci give the agents the possibility to distinguish 
between norm abiding ('respectful') and norm circumventing ('cheating') behaviour. 
The agents learn through direct interaction which agents are 'cheaters' and which are 
'respectful'. The normative strategy is changed in such a way that it is only applied to 
'respectful' agents and is tested against the strategic agents. It turns out that this is not 
enough to improve the situation of the normative agents. Only when neighbouring 
agents are allowed to share their knowledge about 'cheaters', the normative agents do 
almost as well as the strategic ones.  
2.5  
Saam and Harrer (Saam/Harrer 1999) extend the Conte/Castelfranchi-model and try to 
show that the results of Conte and Castelfranchi are only valid for egalitarian 
predator-collector societies. They introduce unequal heritage and unequal renewal of 
resources favouring the agents with more strength. In this case, the norms cause 
higher inequality. They also develop a model which is based on Haferkamp's theory 
of action approach to deviant behaviour. In this model the agent population is divided 
into an in-group and an out-group with different power and strength. The members of 
the in-group comply with the norm and each member have to pay one unit of its 
resources each step for the institutionalisation of the norm. These resources are 
redistributed among all agents. The members of the out-group deviate from the norms 
and are sanctioned by the members of the in-group. Sanctioning decreases the 
resources of both agents, but increases the power of the sanctioning agent. The power 
of an agent influences the nutritional value of the food appearing in the cell he is in. 
The normative strategy now does better than the blind one (higher average strength, 
lower aggression and inequality), but the strategic agents are stronger and have less 
aggression than the normative, i.e. the function of the norm to control aggression has 
vanished. Saam and Harrer's simulations make clear that the functions of norms 
strongly depend on the conditions in the society.  
2.6  
In our simulations we study both the emergence and the effects of norms. A norm 
may or may not emerge and we compare the effects of the existence resp. the non-
existence of it. Different possibilities to enforce the emergence of the norm are 
investigated (sanctions with and without sanctioning costs).The emergence of norms 
is modelled using the meme concept as described in the next section.  
Social Norms and Memes  
3.1  
Social norms are more or less compulsory, generally accepted prescriptions for human 
actions. They regulate what should and what should not be done in specific situations 
and are based on general values. The individuals internalise social norms during 
socialisation. Non-observance of norms is punished with sanctions (Schäfers 1986). A 
very important aspect of norms is that they make the individual's behaviour more 
predictable and allow others to act regarding to the expected behaviour. Other 
functions of norms depend on their specific contents, e.g. norms that regulate co-
ordination or control aggression.  
3.2  
Coleman (1990) states two conditions for the emergence of norms. First, there must 
be the need for a norm. Such a need exists if the action of an individual affects a 
group of other individuals, the effects of this action are similar for the members of 
that group and the impact of this action on the group can not be resolved by simple 
transactions. Second, to satisfy this demand for a norm it is necessary that the 
beneficiaries of the norm sanction the norm violation. Because sanctioning is often 
combined with costs, they have to solve the problem of sharing these costs and the 
benefit for each must be higher then its individual costs. This problem is called 
second order free-rider problem, because every individual would prefer to benefit 
from the norm without paying the sanctioning costs. As we will see, this problem will 
also arise in our simulations. Norms may be set by institutions, result from voluntary 
agreements or emerge without planning. The latter case could be called 'evolutionary' 
norm emergence. In this case, norms result from regularities in behaviour. These 
regularities in behaviour may arise through direct reward or through imitation of a 
model (Opp 1983). We will try to model some kind of 'evolutionary' norm emergence 
without planning. Due to the lack of social structures and communicating possibilities 
in our model, the other types of norm emergence are far off our scope.  
3.3  
This evolutionary emergence of norms from regularities in behaviour can be 
combined with the concept of memes as put forward by Dawkins (Dawkins 1976). 
Memes are parts of cultural tradition, e.g. thoughts, cultural techniques, behaviours, 
etc. They are similar to genes because they are able to replicate themselves. The 
difference is that they may change during lifetime while genes cannot. Passing on 
memes is a cultural process, they are passed from an individual to another by 
imitation. Some memes are more successful than others and are more likely to be 
imitated, so we may speak of a memetic evolution process.  
3.4  
We model social norms using certain behaviours connected with some memes. If an 
individual knows and respects a norm, it acts in a certain way. In our agent model, 
certain behaviour classes are implemented, the presence or absence of which is 
encoded by the presence or absence of certain memes. Note that, in our model, for 
reasons of simplicity we make use of a clear-cut association of specific memes and 
certain behaviours. However, similarly to genes in biology, in general there is no a 
priori reason to assume that behaviour classes could be cleanly separated and that the 
individual behaviours could be matched to specific unique memes. This is a specific 
assumption in our model.  
3.5  
To behave according to a certain norm can be viewed as displaying a certain class of 
behaviours. In our case such a behaviour is e.g. respecting the possession of others. 
We will call the meme that encodes the corresponding behaviour in our model the 
'possession meme'. Not to behave in this way may be sanctioned by others. This 
sanctioning behaviour is encoded by another meme in our model. This meme will be 
called 'sanctioning meme'.  
3.6  
We say that a social norm is present if in an agent society both behaviours are 
displayed by a sufficient portion of the population. Note that we do not require the 
individuals to display both behaviours. In other words, possession respecting 
behaviour and sanctioning behaviour may well be separated, which is the case if the 
individuals who should follow the norm are not the same who enforce it. In our model 
only agents will attempt to enforce the norm that obey it themselves.  
The Model  
4.1  
To model the emergence of possession norms we extend the sugarscape Model by 
Axtell and Epstein. We believe that the extension of a well-known model offers many 
advantages. Results can be seen in an broader context, can be compared to already 
available results and may be easier understood. The reliability of the extension and the 
extended model can be tested through replication of old experiments (Axelrod 1997). 
We choose the sugarscape model because, although being relatively simple, it offers 
various possibilities for extensions in different directions. We stay as close as possible 
to the original model and make changes to parameters or rules only where necessary 
for our purpose. Thus, wherever we do not have an explicit motivation to deviate from 
their model, we will use the Epstein and Axtell settings without further discussion. In 
the following we first describe the sugarscape model of Epstein and Axtell and then 
our extensions in detail.  
The Sugarscape Model 
4.2  
The goal of Epstein and Axtell is to construct artificial societies that model certain 
characteristics of real societies. The aim is not to create a realistic image of a real 
society but to find simple local rules leading to certain global effects. Their 
sugarscape Model consists of agents that inhabit a landscape. The landscape is 
realised as a kind of cellular automaton and provides a special resource, namely sugar. 
The cells can contain different amounts of sugar. Agents move in this landscape, 
collect the sugar and feed upon it. Epstein and Axtell use variations of this basic 
model to create and study a variety of different phenomena, like population growth, 
wealth distribution or migration in a polluted environment.  
4.3  
Cells and agents have certain properties and execute certain rules. A simulation run 
consists of a sequence of simulation steps. During one step each agent and each cell is 
invoked once in random order to execute the relevant rules. Fig. 1 shows such a 
simulation step (the rules mentioned are described in the next paragraphs).  
 
Figure 1: Structure of a simulation step  
4.4  
The landscape is a 50x50 grid of single cells. The cells have a current sugar level and 
maximum sugar capacity which ranges from zero to four. Fig. 2 shows the landscape 
used by Epstein and Axtell. The landscape contains two sugar peaks and forms a 
torus, i.e. agents can move across the border and reach the landscape on the opposite 
side. Agents do not enjoy 'equal opportunity' due to the varying maximum sugar 
capacity. If agents are lucky they are born in the 'sugar highlands', if not, in the 'sugar 
lowlands'. The renewal of the sugar in the cells is regulated by the Sugarscape 
Growback Rule Gα:  
Sugarscape Growback Rule Gα 
In each simulation step, the sugar content of a cell grows by α units until it reaches 
the maximum sugar capacity of the cell. α is an integer. 
 Figure 2: The sugarscape landscape. The size of the dots is proportional to the sugar 
capacity of the cells.  
4.5  
The agents move in the landscape given by Fig. 2 and collect sugar from the cells. 
They collect all sugar from a cell at once and their sugar carrying capacity is 
unlimited. Agents use up a certain amount of sugar each simulation step. This amount 
only depends on the metabolism rate of the agent, which denotes the amount of sugar 
an agent uses up each step. If an agent has no more sugar or if he reaches a certain 
maximum age, he dies and is removed from the simulation. Agents are only able to 
see objects in the four main directions (not diagonally) and have only a limited vision 
range, which denotes the maximum distance (measured in cell units) at which agents 
are able to detect objects. Agents thus only have limited knowledge of the world.  
4.6  
Properties like vision range, metabolism rate or maximum age are fixed integer values 
and do not change during the agent's lifetime. These properties vary from agent to 
agent in a certain range, i.e. agents are heterogeneous with respect to these properties. 
On the other hand, all agents follow the same behavioural rules. Since the agents are 
heterogeneous regarding their properties, however, these rules have different effects.  
4.7  
Agents are only able to move to cells in their vision range which are not occupied by 
other agents. In particular, agent movement is determined by the Agent Movement 
Rule M:  
Agent Movement Rule M 
 search those unoccupied cells in vision range with a maximum amount of 
sugar  
 if several such cells are present, choose the closest one  
 go to this cell  
 collect all the sugar in the cell 
4.8  
Interactions between agents can only take place if the agents are in neighbouring cells 
(only in the main directions; not diagonally). Agents can reproduce. There exist both 
male and female agents. Agents are fertile if their age is in a certain range and if they 
have at least as much sugar as at their own birth. Fertile agents always perform the 
Agent Sex Rule S:  
Agent Sex Rule S 
 select a neighbouring agent randomly  
 if this neighbour is fertile, if the neighbour belongs to the opposite sex, and 
if at least one of both agents has an unoccupied neighbouring cell, a new 
agent is created and placed on this cell  
 if the sugar level of the current agent is high enough to reproduce again, and 
if there are other neighbours that were not selected this update, repeat rule S 
for another neighbour  
4.9  
The new-born agents inherit the properties of their parents. Metabolism rate, vision 
range and maximum age are inherited with a probability of 1/2, i.e. for each of these 
three categories the new-born agent has either the same integer value like the one or 
the other parent. No mutation is applied. From each parent the agent gets half of the 
sugar the parent had at its birth.  
Cultural Tags and Memes 
4.10  
To simulate cultural traits that may change during an agent's life time, Epstein and 
Axtell introduce so-called 'cultural tags'. Each agent has some of these tags which can 
assume two different values each (true/false). Neighbouring agents adjust their 
cultural tags following the Cultural Transmission Rule K
[1]
.After each agent's 
movement, this rule is performed with each neighbour.  
Cultural Transmission Rule K 
 choose randomly one of each neighbour's tags  
 if the tag of the neighbour has the same value as the tag of the current agent, 
do nothing, otherwise set the neighbour's tag to the same value as the current 
agent's tag. 
4.11  
Epstein and Axtell study the formation of cultural different groups and introduce rules 
for combat between these groups. When they introduce a second resource (spice), the 
tags determine which resource is preferred by an agent and thus influence his 
behaviour.  
4.12  
Due to the similarity to the concept of memes by Dawkins and the role these tags play 
in our model, we will call them memes. We say that an agent does or does not carry a 
certain meme depending on the value of the corresponding tag. In our context, these 
memes have much more influence on agent behaviour than in the original work of 
Epstein and Axtell. The Cultural Transmission Rule K is also used for the memes. 
They are passed from parents to children, thereby modeling the influence of the 
parents' education. While this may resemble a Lamarckian process, we construe this 
as a cultural process. In contrast to genetic inheritance, the memes may be changed by 
other agents during lifetime.  
Extension of the Sugarscape Model towards Norm Simulation 
4.13  
We extend and modify the sugarscape model to study the emergence of possession 
norms. An agent in a specific cell can mark this cell if it has not already been marked 
before by a different agent. Other agents can see these marks if the cell is in their 
vision range. If an agent dies, all marks he set during his lifetime are deleted. By 
marking, a cell does not automatically become an agents' possession. Only if the other 
agents respect the mark, i.e. if they do not collect sugar from the cell, the cell can be 
considered to be in possession of the agent by which it has been marked.  
4.14  
The memes regulate the agent's behaviour with respect to marked cells. There is a 
possession and a sanction meme. If an agent carries the possession meme, he never 
will collect sugar from marked cells. Also, under Movement Rule M he will not move 
to such a cell as long as he sees cells where he can collect sugar. Only agents that 
have the possession meme mark cells. Thus, the possession meme actually encodes 
two behaviours: marking cells and not collecting sugar from cells marked by others. It 
would be possible to encode these behaviours in different memes, but we chose to 
encode both behaviours into a single meme.  
4.15  
The sanction meme regulates the behaviour regarding 'norm violation'. If an agent 
carries both the sanction and the possession meme, he will sanction all agents that 
collect sugar on cells marked by other agents if these agents are in his vision range 
(i.e. he is capable of observing the violation). Sanctioning a norm violation means that 
the sugar level of the violating agent is decreased by a certain value. The sanctioning 
agent also loses some sugar because he has to pay the costs of the sanction.  
4.16  
The introduction of memes makes it necessary to change Movement Rule M. When 
the possession norm is activated, agents are less motivated to move near other agents, 
because the cells near another agent are often in the possession of other agents, 
preventing the moving agent to collect sugar from the cell. For that reason we need 
the Movement Rule MS, which favours reproduction to collecting sugar:  
Movement Rule MS 
 if current agent is not fertile, perform movement rule M  
 otherwise search all unoccupied cells in vision range neighbouring a fertile 
agent of the opposite sex  
 if no such cell is found, perform rule M, otherwise go to a cell with a 
maximum amount of sugar  
 if several such cells are present, choose the closest one  
 collect all the sugar from the cell  
4.17  
To test which of the rules M and MS is preferable in an evolutionary sense, we give 
our agents a 'movement gene'. If the 'movement gene' is active the agents perform rule 
MS, otherwise rule M. Fig. 3 shows the evolutionary advantage of rule MS. The 
figure shows the portion of agents with the movement gene. The other parameters are 
chosen like the standards from Epstein and Axtell: rule S and G1 are active, vision 
range and metabolism are randomly chosen integers from one to four, maximum age 
is a random integer between 60 and 100.  
 
Figure 3: The portion of agents with the movement gene. Agents with the gene 
perform rule MS, others rule M. Rules S and G1 are active, vision range and 
metabolism range from one to four. 
4.18  
In addition to the cultural transmission rule K we also use an alternative cultural 
transmission rule K+. The rule K+ works similar to K, but here, the cultural adoption 
of the memes depends on the sugar level of both agents. The 'poorer' agent adapts his 
meme to the memes of the 'richer' agent. Thereby, the behaviour that seems to be 
more successful is imitated. Like rule K, K is performed after an agent's movement.  
Cultural Transmission Rule K+ 
 for each neighbouring agent select randomly one of his memes  
 if the meme has the same value as the corresponding meme of the current 
agent, do nothing. Otherwise set the meme of the agent with less sugar to the 
same meme value as that of the agent with more sugar. If both agents have 
the same sugar level, the meme of the newly arrived agent is adopted.  
4.19  
We choose K and K+ for its simplicity. Many other rules are possible. For example, 
one could use Latané's Theory of Social Impact as Nowak and Latané did in their 
simulations (Nowak/Latané 1994, Latané 1996). This theory states that the "...social 
impact is a multiplicative function of the strength, immediacy, and number of people 
influencing an individual" (Latané 1996, p. 289). In our model one could use one 
agent's sugar wealth to determine the strength and use the distance between two 
agents as a measure for immediacy.  
4.20  
Some changes with respect to the model developed by Epstein and Axtell (the 
"original" sugarscape model), in particular concerning the metabolism rate and the 
vision range, were made. In the original model, these values evolve during the run. In 
our model, we keep values for metabolism rate and vision range fixed during each 
simulation, but vary these values for different simulation scenarios. This allows us to 
better control the conditions of the simulations and to interpret the results more easily. 
We use the same sugarscape landscape as in the original model (Fig.2) with the 
difference that we multiply the original cell's sugar capacity (ranging from zero to 
four) by ten, to allow more variations of the metabolism rate (from two to ten).  
Results  
5.1  
Since the model offers a lot of options to modify the simulation parameters, it is not 
possible to test all combinations of the parameters. We will keep some parameters 
fixed during all our simulations and will vary other systematically. In choosing the 
values for the fixed parameters, we use the same as Epstein and Axtell did for their 
simulation. A change concerns the age of the agents in the first simulation step of a 
run. Epstein and Axtell use an age of zero for all agents, which causes very 'unnatural' 
age distributions at the beginning of the runs and takes some time to normalise. In our 
simulation, we use a random current age for each agent of the first generation 
distributed equally between zero and the maximum age of the individual agent 
instead.  
 
Table 1: Ranges of the fixed properties  
 
parameter range   meaning 
initial sugar 
level 
50-
100 
 the amount of sugar the agents of the first generation 
get at birth; the following generations inherit their 
initial sugar from their parents 
maximum 
age 
60-
100 
 the maximum number of simulation steps an agent 
lives; he may starve earlier if he does not collect 
enough sugar; children inherit the maximum age 
from one of their parents 
male 
fertility start 
12-15  the number of the simulation steps when the 
male/female fertility starts/ends; children inherit the 
fertility range from the parent with the same sex 
male 
fertility end 
50- 
60 
  
female 
fertility start 
12-15   
female 
fertility end 
40-50   
number of 
memes 
11  the number of memes influence the probability for 
each single meme to be changed through cultural 
transmission; in our model only two memes have a 
special meaning 
 
5.2  
Different from Epstein and Axtell, we perform not only single runs for each parameter 
setting, but always do 100 simulation runs of 2000 steps for each with different 
random seeds. We also change metabolism rate and vision range systematically from 
two to ten in steps of two while we keep the other parameters fixed. This makes it 
possible to study emergence versus non-emergence and the effects of the norms and 
sanctions under conditions that offer different degrees of advantage to the agents. In 
our experiments, we vary both the sugar penalty for agents that are punished by 
sanctions and the costs for the sanctioning agent.  
5.3  
As landscape we use the original sugarscape landscape with tenfold sugar capacity for 
the reasons stated above. We always start with 400 agents and always use the rules 
MS, S and G1, which means that in each step each cell gets one piece of sugar up to 
the cell capacity. For cultural transmission we use the rules K or K+ or none of these 
rules, which means that memes are only passed on from the parents to their children.  
Effects of Possession Memes 
5.4  
Before we try to model the emergence of the norm we just wish to know how the 
possession meme affects the society. First, we set the possession meme to false for all 
agents and do not use cultural transmission. In the following series of experiments we 
set the possession meme to true for all agents. Metabolism rate and vision range is 
varied systematically. It turns out that, without the possession meme, under 
unfavourable conditions the population often becomes extinct before the 2000 
simulation steps are over. Figs. 4and 5 show the portion of the runs in which the 
population survived for the different metabolism rates and vision ranges. Note that, 
since we performed 100 runs for each set of parameters, the survival frequency is 
numerically equivalent to the percentual survival probability.  
 
Figure 4: Frequency of survival without possession meme. The figure shows that 
number of the runs in which the agent population survived 2000 steps versus different 
metabolism rates and vision ranges  
 Figure 5: Frequency of survival with possession meme  
5.5  
As the figures show, survival frequency is much higher if the agents mark cells and 
respect possession. Without the meme, the agents are only able to survive with a 
metabolism rate of two. Vision range has no effects on that. With the meme, the 
agents survive more frequently under unfavourable conditions. In this case, especially 
for high metabolism rates, vision range affects the survival probability, which is due 
to the fact that for existing possession memes it is extremely important to have a large 
vision range to find sugar on unmarked or self-marked cells. With small vision range 
an agent may possess a large number of cells, but if he does not see them, he will not 
be able to make use of them.  
5.6  
A closer analysis of the reasons for the extinction of the population without 
possession memes shows that, without the meme, the agents are often too poor to 
reproduce. This is due to the fact that they usually collect less sugar on the average 
than with activated possession meme. The advantage of possession is that it can 
guarantee a higher sugar income, because more sugar can 'grow' in the cells until it is 
collected. So agents can collect more sugar per step. For an agent with a metabolism 
rate of two it is sufficient to own two cells. He can shuttle forth and back and can 
collect two pieces of sugar each time, because no other agent will eat the sugar 
belonging to it.  
5.7  
An interesting point regards the carrying capacity of the landscape. With activated 
possession, less agents live in the landscape on average. Fig.6 shows the average 
number of agents living in the landscape (if the population survived the 2000 steps) 
for different vision ranges and metabolism rates. Without the meme the result is 
shown only for metabolism rate two because for other rates the population almost 
always becomes extinct.  
 Figure 6: Average number of agents in simulation runs with (poss.) and without (no 
poss.) meme and different vision ranges  
5.8  
Vision range hardly influences the carrying capacity of the landscape (except the step 
from vision range two to vision range four). For metabolism rate two there is a big 
difference in the average carrying capacity with and without the possession meme. 
Without possession meme there are about 150 more agents living in the landscape 
because resources can be used up better in this setting. Sugar is wasted if a cell 
reaches the maximum capacity and no agent collects this sugar. This happens more 
often with existing possession because the agents do not collect sugar in foreign cells 
and do not know about 'their' cells if they are not in their vision range. As it can also 
be seen in Fig. 6, the vision range has practically no impact on the carrying capacity 
of the landscape (especially for vision ranges higher then two). For low metabolism 
rates population density without the meme is higher, but for larger metabolism rates 
agents can only survive with the meme.  
Establishment of Possession Norms 
5.9  
Next, we want to study whether the possession meme is able to assert itself, so we 
give half of the population the possession meme and switch on the cultural 
transmission rule K. The sanction meme is not active. Since we have eleven memes 
(as in the original Epstein/Axtell model), the probability to pass the possession meme 
is 1/11. As we see in Fig. 7, the result is that the survival frequency is just as bad as in 
the case where no possession memes exist.  
 Figure 7: Frequency of survival with active possession meme in 50% of the initial 
agent population 
5.10  
A closer look at the proportion of the agents with the possession meme after the 2000 
steps shows, that the meme could only assert itself two times. In all other runs, the 
meme disappears. A look at runs where the population becomes extinct shows that, 
after the meme disappears, the population becomes extinct. So the reason for the 
extinction is the inability of the possession meme to establish itself. Fig 8. shows the 
extinction of the population in a run without possession memes with a metabolism 
rate of four and a vision range of six. Fig. 9 shows a run with exactly the same 
parameters except that there half of the agents know the possession meme at the 
beginning. The population survives slightly longer but after the meme disappears, it 
also becomes extinct.  
 
Figure 8: Population growth without possession meme, a metabolism of four and a 
vision range of six  
 Figure 9: Total population size (higher curve) and number of agents with possession 
meme (lower curve), metabolism four and vision range six  
5.11  
At first, the portion of the agents with active possession meme is approximately 50% 
which remains stable even during the initial decrease of the population size the first 
100 steps (note that we plot the absolute size of the population and not the relative 
portion of agents with active possession meme). This portion only begins to vary as 
the population size begins to increase. The agents without possession meme can 
reproduce significantly better. When the population size reaches the second maximum 
of approximately 600 agents, only between 10% and 20% of the agents have a 
possession meme. During the next drop of the population size, the meme finally 
becomes extinct. The non-observance of the possession meme results in short-term 
advantages for the agents, so that they can reproduce considerably more often. As a 
result, the portion of the agents respecting possession decreases, so that the meme 
finally disappears completely and as a consequence the agents become extinct. Agents 
not respecting possessions of others gain short-time advantages even if their 
behaviour endangers the survival of the whole population in the long run.  
5.12  
To enforce the establishment of a possession norm, sanctions have to be introduced. 
Thus, we activate the sanction meme and apply a punishment of four on those who do 
not follow the norm. First, we do not apply sanction costs. We investigate whether the 
norm is able to establish itself if we have 50% supporters in the beginning. In other 
words, the possession meme is active in half of the population at the beginning and 
the sanction meme in the whole population, i.e. all agents carrying the possession 
meme sanction its violation.  
 Figure 10: Frequency of survival with 50% possession meme, 100% sanction meme 
and a punishment of four  
5.13  
As can be seen in Fig. 10, the survival frequency is better than without sanctions, 
especially for high vision ranges. This is due to the establishment of a possession 
norm, as a closer analysis shows. In the cases where the population survived all agents 
have the possession meme in the end. The vision range has a high impact on the 
assertion of the norm: the smaller the vision range, the harder it is to establish the 
norm. Fig. 11 shows this correlation for a metabolism rate of six and punishments of 
two, four and six. The impact of the vision range on the establishment of the norm can 
easily be explained: with high vision ranges there are more agents that observe a norm 
violation. Accordingly, the overall punishment for a violation is considerably higher 
than for small vision ranges.  
 
Figure 11: Frequency of survival with metabolism six, vision range reaches from two 
to ten, 50% possession meme, 100% sanction meme and various punishments  
5.14  
If at the beginning of a simulation the sanction meme is only present in half of the 
population, i.e. at the beginning only approximately one quarter of the population 
punishes norm violations, punishment has to be approximately twice as high in order 
to achieve the same effect. That means that the overall punishment is the crucial 
factor for establishing the norm.  
5.15  
If costs exist, sanctioning agents have disadvantages compared to those who do not 
sanction. Although they have an interest that norm violating agents are sanctioned, 
they also have an interest in not being the one who performs the sanctions. So we 
have a second order free-rider problem in this case. The collective long-term interest 
in establishing the norm is opposed by the short-time advantage in saving the costs for 
the sanctions. If costs exist, the survival frequency drops due to the difficulties in 
establishing the norm. This is demonstrated by Fig. 12 with a punishment of twelve 
and costs of four. At the beginning of a simulation, both the possession and the 
sanction meme are active in 50% of the agent population.  
 
Figure 12: Frequency of survival with 50% possession meme, 50% sanction meme, 
punishment twelve and costs of four  
5.16  
In case of a run with a metabolism rate of four and a vision range of six, Fig. 13 
illustrates two points: at the beginning the possession meme can propagate very well, 
the portion of the sanction meme, however, decreases right from the beginning. If this 
drop is strong enough, the possession meme loses its advantage and its portion drops 
as well. From an individual's point of view, the problem of the costs mainly does not 
consist in paying for sanctions, but in the fact that there are others which do not pay 
anything. This way, these agents have a 'parasitic' advantage compared to the 
sanctioning agents, which causes the portion of the sanction meme to decrease.  
 Figure 13: Percentage of the possession meme and the sanction meme with costs 
four, metabolism four, and a vision range of six  
Role of the Memes 
5.17  
In order to analyse the role of the memes more precisely, one can compare the 
performed runs with further runs in which either no culture transfer rule is active, i.e. 
inheritance of memes only works from parents to their children, or the modified rule 
K+ is valid. It turns out that similar effects occur in both cases. As long as no 
sanctions exist, the enforcement strength of the possession meme is even slightly 
worse than before. That is because both K+ and a disabled cultural transmission speed 
up the disappearance of the meme. The average time until the possession meme 
disappears, is given in Fig. 14, with a metabolism rate of two and a 50% portion of 
agents with active possession meme at the beginning of a run. In this case, the 
sanction meme is not active. The plots show that with rule K, the possession meme 
displays the longest survival time. Agents without the meme reproduce more often, 
but the evolutionary pressure is a little bit weakened since K ignores the success of 
the meme's owner.  
 Figure 14: Average time until the possession meme disappears with metabolism two 
and 50% possession meme at the beginning of the run  
5.18  
However, if sanctions are introduced, agents can survive more easily, both without 
any cultural transmission rule at all or with rule K+, than with rule K. This becomes 
clear by comparing Fig. 10 with Fig. 15. In both cases 50% of the agents know the 
norm at the beginning and all agents knowing the norm sanction its violation. In Fig. 
10 rule K is valid, in Fig.15 no cultural transmission takes place (the results are very 
similar to the case where K+ is valid). Especially for vision ranges of four and six the 
survival frequency with disabled cultural transmission and with K+ is significantly 
better. The better survival frequency is due to the fact that the establishment of the 
norm is speeded up.  
 
Figure 15: Frequency of survival without cultural transmission with 50% possession 
meme, 100% sanction meme and a punishment of four  
5.19  
In case of existing sanction costs, the agents society survives a little bit better with 
rule K than without, as a comparison between Fig. 12 and Fig. 16 shows. However, 
the situation is not so easy to analyse because two memes are involved, but it seems 
that rule K slows down the disappearance of the sanction meme and thus promotes the 
establishment of the norm.  
 
Figure 16: Frequency of survival without cultural transmission with 50% possession 
meme, 50% sanction meme, punishment twelve and costs of four  
Conclusion  
6.1  
In our simulations the existence respectively the non existence of possession has a 
strong impact on the probability of survival of the agent population. A notion of 
possession enables the agent society to survive better also under unfavourable 
conditions. Thus, from the society point of view, there is a need for a possession 
norm. As we have seen, norms can emerge under certain conditions. We will try to 
explain our results in the light of Coleman's theory of norm emergence. We have to 
clarify whether there is a need for a norm from an individual point of view or not. In 
other words: are there external effects which cause an individual demand for a norm? 
An agent collecting sugar may influence agents close to him because he reduces the 
amount of sugar they can collect at once. However, especially for high metabolism 
rates this causes a problem because in this case the agents vitally depend on collecting 
a large amounts of sugar at once. Thus, we find that there is indeed a demand for a 
norm.  
6.2  
In any case, it is not obvious how to enforce the norm in this scenario because the 
agents have some short-term advantages if they do not respect the norm. There exists 
a gap between the individual and the collective rationality. This is a typical dilemma 
found in human societies. Examples are the protection of the environment or the duty 
to pay taxes. Sanctions have to be introduced to impose costs on agents deviating 
from what is desirable for agents who obey the norm and for the society as whole. 
Sanctions provide a good possibility to enforce the norm as long as they are not 
combined with costs for the sanctioning individual. If such costs exist, we have a 
second order free-rider problem. To achieve the emergence of norms, this problem 
has to be solved. Without costs, no problem exists and the norm emerges if the 
sanctions are sufficiently high. With costs, the probability of the emergence depends 
on both the level of costs and the level of punishment. The problem could be solved 
with metanorms as Axelrod showed in his simulations (Axelrod 1986) or through 
proper mechanisms which allow to share the sanctioning costs among all members of 
the society. Institutions are such mechanisms to share the costs of enforcing norms. 
Furthermore, sometimes institutions are also responsible for setting norms. On the 
other hand, institutions are, in turn, based on norms. It would be an interesting task for 
the future to simulate this two-way dependence of norms and institutions.  
6.3  
A closer investigation of the meme propagation shows that rule K slows down both 
the disappearance of a meme and its enforcement. The influence of short-term success 
on the distribution of memes is decreased slightly by K. In such a way, the possession 
meme can survive a bit longer than without sanctions. On the other hand, if sanctions 
are introduced, the meme does not establish itself that fast. In case of existing sanction 
costs, the positive effect of rule K particularly seems to be that the drop of the 
sanction meme in the population is slowed down and therefore the possession norm 
can assert itself more easily.  
6.4  
As we have shown, norms could be modelled using Dawkin's concept of memes. Due 
to the flexibility of this concept it should be easy to model some other kinds of norms, 
norm emergence and norm propagation. We believe that the combination of norms 
with the concept of memes offers various opportunities for constructing multi-agent 
systems as well as for sociological theory building and social simulation.  
6.5  
A problem of our current model is that the agents are not able to change their 
behaviour due to learning processes during life-time. Integrating some learning 
mechanisms in the agents would make it possible that agents learn when to respect 
and when not to respect the norm. It would also be interesting to combine our model 
with approaches that give agents the possibility to recognise other agents, so that they 
could regulate their behaviour according to the experiences they have already made 
with a certain agent. The long-range goal is to enable the agents to organise 
themselves and to build up institutions, leading to the emergence of more complex 
society structures.  
 
Notes 
<DT 
1
Epstein and Axtell use K as symbol for a combination of two rules:The agent cultural 
transmission andthe group membership rule. Since we do not need the group 
membership rule, in our work K only denotes the cultural transmission rule. Note that, 
apart from that, we use the original cultural transmission rule without modification.  
 
Online Resources 
Executables (Win 95/98/NT), source code (Borland Delphi 4) and tables of all our 
experiments are accessible via <http://www.Informatik.Uni-Mainz.DE/~flentge/norm-
sim_eng.html>  
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